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Highlights 
 Compares effects of two sets of instructions on behaviour in public goods games 
 Detailed instructions are associated with higher comprehension levels, measured by decision 
times 
 Without punishment, instruction format does not affect public goods contributions 
 With punishment, contributions are higher with longer, more explicit instructions  
 Detailed instructions are associated with better targeting of low contributors for punishment 
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Abstract 
We provide evidence that more explicit instructions can affect behaviour in a public goods 
game with punishment. Instructions that highlight the positive externality associated with 
public goods contributions and provide more examples improve subjects‟ comprehension 
levels, as measured by shorter decision times in the experiment. They also lead to higher 
contribution levels in games with punishment opportunities, linked to better targeting of 
punishment.  
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1. Introduction 
There is ample evidence that the format in which instructions are presented to students can 
significantly influence the degree to which learning can be facilitated. Chandler and Sweller 
(1991) develop the cognitive load theory to argue that information should be presented in 
ways that do not impose heavy cognitive loads – otherwise hampering learning. Modern 
versions differentiate three kinds of cognitive loads: intrinsic (the complexity of the matter 
itself), germane (effective) and extraneous (irrelevant). While these principles have guided 
the design of instructions in (educational) psychology and educational research (see De Jong, 
2010), there has been little research in experimental economics that focuses explicitly on how 
alternative instructions impact subjects‟ understanding of the decision task.   
A large amount of attention has, instead, focused on the effects of decision frames on 
behaviour. Since the seminal work by Tversky and Kahnemann (1981), plenty of 
experimental work in economics has analysed how the description of decision problems and 
strategic situations affects people‟s perception of the situation, and their choices and 
behaviour. As relevant examples for our research, in a public goods game, Andreoni (1995) 
studies the differences in contributions in positive vs negative frames and, more recently, 
Cubitt et al. (2011) and Ramalingam et al. (2017) study differences in contribution and 
punishment behaviour in one-shot and repeated provision vs appropriation games. 
In this paper, we study the effect of the instruction format not on subjects‟ perception of a 
situation but on subjects‟ comprehension of the situation, designing instructions to increase 
subject comprehension of the incentive structures of the laboratory decision setting. 
Ultimately, the goal is to study whether higher comprehension affects behaviour.  
Recent work documents that instruction format can have significant effects on 
comprehension levels of subjects in economics experiments. In a repeated linear public goods 
experiment, Bigoni and Dragone (2012) (henceforth BD12) identify two factors that 
influence the effectiveness of experimental instructions – their length and subjects‟ active 
involvement. They find that short on-screen instructions worsen comprehension (measured 
by the number of wrong answers, and the time taken to answer a pre-experiment quiz), while 
instructions of a similar length that required subjects to actively solve examples during the 
instruction stage were found to increase comprehension levels.
1
 However, BD12 do not find 
                                                          
1
 They did not run treatments with online long instructions or long instructions that required active input.  
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evidence that differences in comprehension levels are associated with differences in 
contributions. They observe the usual pattern of behaviour (see Chaudhuri, 2011), with 
declining contributions across treatments. 
While these results regarding behaviour might be reassuring at first glance, there are reasons 
for further investigation into this aspect of the experimental methodology. A possible reason 
for the finding of BD12 is the relatively simple nature of the public goods game where a 
participant makes one decision - contribution - in each round. Instruction length and format 
may thus not have serious implications for behaviour in such a setting. However, combined 
with previous evidence that some subjects‟ decisions appear to be at least partially linked to 
confusion (see Andreoni, 1995), it is plausible that lack of comprehension would have more 
noticeable effects on behaviour in more complicated settings.
2
  
As suggested by Cognitive Load Theory, intrinsic cognitive load is higher in more complex 
settings. However, instructions designed to improve understanding of the more complex 
setting are likely to reduce the germane load on experimental subjects. It is plausible that 
such instructions have an impact on behaviour because they reduce the overall cognitive load. 
Our study presents evidence that supports this conjecture.
3
  
One of the most studied results in the social dilemmas literature is the ability of groups to use 
peer punishment to govern themselves, i.e., to raise cooperation levels and sustain these 
higher levels over time (for instance, Ostrom et al., 1992 and Fehr and Gächter, 2000). 
Successful punishment is associated with three factors: (i) sufficient punishment to render the 
threat credible, (ii) punishment targeted at free-riders, and (iii) punishment of low 
contributors not being crowded-out by anti-social punishment of high contributors (see 
Hermann et al., 2008 and Rand et al., 2010). 
Arguably, therefore, the punishment game is more complex than a simple public goods game 
without the option to sanction one another. First, there are more decisions to make in the 
game with punishment. Second, the punishment decision involves more complicated 
reasoning on the part of subjects in identifying who and how much to punish. If, as has been 
shown, instruction length has significant effects on comprehension, we are more likely to see 
                                                          
2
 BD12 note that their conclusions may “depend on the complexity of the task” (p. 463). 
3
 We are aware of one other work that looks at different instruction formats, based on Cognitive Load Theory. 
Kirmes (2014) provides preliminary evidence from a pilot experiment that instructions with stick-figure 
illustrations (that help understanding by reducing the germane load) reduce decision times in public goods and 
market entry games. However, given that these results are preliminary, the findings are not conclusive. 
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effects on outcomes in more complicated settings, i.e., in the punishment game. Given the 
increasing complexity of some experiments in recent times, and the resulting wide variety of 
instructions used, it is extremely important, and timely, to investigate the potential effects that 
instruction format and complexity may have on subject comprehension levels and behaviour.   
In this study we examine the effect of instruction format on decisions in two environments 
that differ in complexity; experimental public goods games with and without punishment 
opportunities. Thus, our treatments vary along two dimensions – availability of punishment 
and format of instructions – to implement a 2 × 2 design. In all four treatments, subjects 
played a repeated linear public goods game using the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism 
(VCM). In two treatments, subjects played only the VCM. In the remaining two treatments, 
subjects played a two-stage game where the first stage was the VCM. In the second stage, 
subjects could use their earnings from the first stage to sanction each other (as in Gächter et 
al., 2008). 
In one pair of VCM and punishment treatments, subjects were given short instructions while 
in the other pair, subjects were given longer instructions that made explicit the positive 
externality associated with contributions to the public good. Versions of both sets of 
instructions have been widely used. The longer instructions were based on Gächter et al. 
(2008) while the shorter instructions were based on Fatas and Mateu (2015). We used 
important elements from the instructions in these papers and further adapted them to reflect 
our experimental parameters. 
While punishment experiments that use the longer instructions (including Gächter et al., 
2008) have generated sustained increases in contributions, Fatas and Mateu (2015) find only 
modest increases in contributions. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no systematic 
investigation of such differences in punishment behaviour, or of reasons for the differences. It 
is thus not yet clear if, or how, the length and format of instructions may have an influence on 
observed differences across studies examining the punishment institution.   
The two instruction formats in our study differed in important respects. First, the shorter 
instructions were one and two pages long respectively for the games with and without 
punishment while the corresponding longer instructions were three and four pages long. 
Second, the shorter instructions had only two solved examples each while the longer 
instructions had three examples each. Third, and perhaps most important, the longer 
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instructions made salient the positive externality inherent in the public goods game while the 
shorter instructions stopped with the description of the game and calculation of payoffs.  
Our results lend support to the findings in BD12. As in BD12, we find that the shorter 
instructions do negatively affect comprehension levels in the VCM. When given shorter 
instructions, subjects took significantly longer to make contribution decisions in each round. 
As in BD12, we find that that average contributions start higher in the VCM sessions with 
longer instructions, but averages across all decision rounds are similar and show the common 
trend of declining contributions across all decisions rounds.   
As in the VCM, comprehension levels were significantly lower in the shorter instructions 
punishment treatment. Subjects took significantly longer to make contribution and 
punishment decisions when they were given short instructions. What is different is that 
instruction length is associated with significant differences in behaviour in the punishment 
game. We find that when given the short instructions, groups were less successful in raising 
contribution levels. At best, they were able to stem the decline observed in the VCM across 
decision rounds. On the other hand, groups that received the longer more explicit instructions 
raised contributions to 75% of endowment and were able to sustain this higher level 
throughout the game. This is driven by differences in punishment behaviour – low 
contributors were targeted for punishment much more often.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 details our experimental design and 
presents the crucial differences between instruction formats. Section 3 presents our 
hypotheses, Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains the 
experimental instructions for all our treatments. Appendix B contains the pre-experiment 
quizzes that subjects had to answer. Appendix C presents additional analysis that explores 
subjects‟ response times further, and heterogeneity among groups in the punishment 
treatments.  
 
2. Experimental design 
In all treatments, groups of four subjects played a repeated VCM game. Each player was 
endowed with 20 tokens which could be invested in an Individual Project (IP) or in a Group 
Project (GP). A token invested in the IP yielded a return of one token and a token invested in 
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the GP yielded a return of 0.5 tokens for each of the four group members, i.e., MPCR = 0.5. 
The per-period payoff of player i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is given by 
  ( )  (     )     ∑  
 
   
   
where    is i‟s contribution to the public good, and   is the contribution profile in the group. The 
Nash equilibrium, based on self- regarding preferences and the same belief for all other 
players, is for all players to contribute 0 tokens to the GP. The social optimum is for everyone 
to contribute all 20 tokens to the GP. The equilibrium and the optimum remain unchanged in 
finite repetitions.  
Our treatments varied two dimensions, resulting in a 2 × 2 design: (1) whether or not there 
were punishment opportunities in the VCM game and (2) two types of instructions. In two 
conditions (VCM), subjects played only the VCM game described above. In two conditions 
(Pun), subjects played a two-stage game. The first stage was the VCM game. In the second 
stage, subjects could use their first-stage earnings to punish each other. As in Gächter et al. 
(2008), a player could use at most 5 tokens to sanction any other player. Thus, in total a 
subject could assign up to 15 punishment tokens in the second stage, or his/her stage 1 
earnings, whichever was lower. The punishment technology was 1:3, i.e., one punishment 
token assigned cost the sender 1 token and the recipient 3 tokens. Per-period payoffs are now 
given by 
  (   )  (     )     ∑  
 
   
 ∑   
 
   
   
  ∑   
 
   
   
   
where   is the punishment profile in the group,     is the number of punishment tokens 
assigned by player i to player j (   ), and     is the number of punishment tokens assigned 
by player j to player i (   ). The Nash equilibrium in the punishment game is zero 
contributions and zero punishment by all players. The social optimum is full contributions 
and zero punishment by all players. Both remain unchanged in finite repetitions.  
In both VCM and Pun treatments, we explore differences in subject comprehension and 
behaviour, contrasting behaviour when subjects read shorter/less explicit instructions versus 
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longer/more explicit instructions (online Appendix A).
4
 Our longer instructions were 
designed to provide more information and details, with a view to improving subjects‟ 
understanding of the decision situation. The two sets of instructions differ in several ways. 
For brevity, we use the terms “LOW” (L) and “HIGH” (H) to refer to the targeted 
comprehension levels in, respectively, the shorter and the more detailed sets of instructions.
5
 
The differences between our short and long instructions are as follows.  
In the HIGH instructions, to direct subjects‟ attention to the positive externality associated 
with public good contributions, the spill over was made more explicit. The LOW instructions 
simply described the calculation of earnings from the contribution stage, i.e., described the 
first payoff function above in words. They did not mention the implications of one‟s 
contributions for other group members. The HIGH instructions stated “For each token you 
allocate to the Group Project, you will earn 0.5 tokens. Each of the other three people in your 
group will also earn 0.5 tokens. Thus, the allocation of 1 token to the Group Project yields a 
total of 2 tokens for all of you together.” They also stated “you will earn from your own 
allocation as well as from the allocations of others.” The HIGH instructions used a bold font 
to emphasize key attributes of the decision settings.  
The LOW and HIGH instructions contained, respectively, two and three solved examples 
each. The two examples in VCM-L illustrated the payoff consequence of different levels of 
contributions by the four subjects in the group. Pun-L used the same contribution examples as 
VCM-L, with additional examples tied to how a subject‟s earnings were affected by 
punishing others and by being punished. The examples were presented at the end of the 
instructions. Thus the examples were designed to combine illustrations of contributions to the 
public good and illustrations of subjects‟ opportunity to reduce the earnings of other group 
members (examples of the payoff implications of sending and receiving punishment). In the 
VCM-H and Pun-H instructions, one example illustrated the zero contribution outcome, one 
example the social optimum outcome, and the third an intermediate level of contribution by 
one subject when the other subjects contributed nothing. Thus, in the HIGH instructions, the 
examples also focused on highlighting the positive externality associated with contributions. 
In contrast to the LOW instructions, the examples were presented after the description of 
Stage 1 of the game (the contribution stage) in both HIGH treatments. In Pun-H, the 
                                                          
4
 The more detailed instructions and the data from VCM-H and Pun-H were used in Ramalingam et al. (2016).  
5
 In BD12, their long instructions were designed to add repetition of elements of the shorter instructions. In our 
experiment, the differences are more nuanced. This is the reason we repeat the VCM treatment with both sets of 
instructions in our experiment. 
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instructions went on to describe the punishment stage. However, there were no further 
examples; unlike in Pun-L, there were no examples of punishment use and their implications 
for earnings. This reflects our assumption that a better understanding of the social dilemma, a 
result of highlighting the positive externality, is sufficient to improve subjects‟ 
comprehension of the use of punishment as well.  
The objective was to investigate if instructions can lead to differences in behaviour. Hence, 
as noted above, we allowed our LOW and HIGH instructions to vary in more than one 
dimension. However, our conjecture is that the greater understanding of the game afforded by 
greater focus on the positive externality is most likely to improve comprehension levels and, 
thus, affect behaviour in the more complex punishment game.
6
 Once an effect on behaviour 
has been established, future work will need to explicitly test this conjecture.  
In all sessions, subjects were given printed instructions that were also read aloud by the same 
experimenter in every session. Subjects could ask clarifying questions at any point, which 
were answered privately. All subjects then had to individually answer a quiz that tested their 
understanding of the calculation of the payoffs in the game.
7
 There were three questions in 
the quiz in the VCM treatments, each of which asked subjects to calculate their own payoffs 
and the payoffs of others in the group for a hypothetical contribution profile. One question 
presented the Nash equilibrium allocation, one the social optimum and the third one 
presented a situation in which the subject was the only non-contributor in the group while the 
others in the group contributed 100% of their endowments. Subjects had to answer the same 
three questions in the quiz in the punishment treatments. However, there were two additional 
questions, the first of which asked the cost of assigning punishment and the second the cost 
of receiving punishment. Importantly, the quiz was the same regardless of the length of the 
instructions. In particular, subjects answered the same quiz in VCM-L and in VCM-H and the 
same quiz in Pun-L and in Pun-H.  
Subjects were given calculators that they could use during the quiz and the experiment. 
Subjects had to answer all questions correctly before the experiment could begin. At the end 
of the quiz, all subjects were given printed answers (with explanations) to all the questions on 
the quiz. They could ask further clarifying questions at this stage.  
                                                          
6
 The HIGH instructions, though longer, are likely to impose a lower cognitive load, as they have reduced the 
load associated with trying to understand the game. In the LOW instructions, subjects have to figure out the 
important aspects of the game for themselves, thus increasing their cognitive load. 
7
 Thus, subjects were actively involved, and forced inputs were required of subjects in all treatments. See BD12. 
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In all treatments, subjects interacted in the same group for 20 rounds (partner-matching). 
After the contribution stage in each round, subjects were shown the individual contributions 
of all players in their group in descending order. They were also shown the total contribution 
to the GP in their group and their earnings from the IP and the GP. No subject identifiers 
were used in order to minimise the possibility of reputation formation.  
In the punishment treatments, subjects could assign punishment tokens to other individuals in 
their group in the second stage. Subjects were then shown the total punishment they received 
and their earnings from the two stages of the round. They were not told the identity of the 
group member who punished them.   
Table 1 summarises characteristics of each treatment and the number of independent 
observations (groups) and subjects in each.  
Table 1. Summary of treatments 
Treatment Punishment? 
Length  of 
instructions 
Inst. 
word 
count 
No. of 
examples 
No. of 
groups 
No. of 
subjects 
VCM-L No Short 503 2 11 44 
Pun-L Yes Short 834 2 15 60 
VCM-H No Long 1039 3 10 40 
Pun-H Yes Long 1345 3 12 48 
Total     48 192 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All sessions were conducted 
at EssexLab by the same experimenter. Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate 
student body at the University of Essex and had not participated in a public goods experiment 
before this. To minimise timing effects, we ran different sessions for each treatment at 
different times of the day. No subject participated in more than one treatment. Sessions with 
short instructions lasted 70 minutes on average, while sessions with long instructions lasted 
55 minutes on average.
8
  
Earnings could not be carried forward for use in future rounds and subjects received a fresh 
endowment of 20 tokens in each round. Subjects were paid their earnings from all 20 rounds 
of the game. Token earnings were converted to Pounds at the rate of 60 tokens to £1 and 
subjects received an average payment of approximately £12 including a £2.50 show-up fee.  
                                                          
8
 This already indicates that comprehension levels, as measured by decision times, are higher in the HIGH 
treatments.  
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3. Hypotheses  
Our conjecture is that the HIGH instructions will be associated with higher subject 
comprehension levels regarding the strategic incentives of the game and consequences for 
individual and group earnings. Better comprehension thus ought to allow subjects to work out 
the ramifications of their actions quicker. One implication of this would be that subjects 
would need less time to answer the pre-experiment quiz that tests their ability to calculate 
payoffs under hypothetical contribution scenarios. However, as mentioned earlier, two of the 
examples in the HIGH instructions also appeared on the quiz, while this was not the case in 
the treatments with the LOW instructions. Thus, looking at quiz times alone might present an 
incomplete picture of comprehension levels.  
However, once the experiment began, subjects had to respond to actual decisions made by 
others in their groups. Better comprehension would imply shorter decision times here as well. 
Our proxy measure for understanding is thus the time taken by subjects to make contribution 
or punishment decisions.  
Hypothesis 1: The average time taken by subjects to make contribution and punishment 
decisions will be lower in treatments with the HIGH instructions. 
If subject comprehension is different across instruction formats, we should observe 
differences in contribution levels in the very first period, immediately after reading the 
instructions. BD12 find that short on-screen instructions are associated with lower 
comprehension levels. Further, they lead to lower average contributions to the public good in 
the first round than do the other three instruction formats they consider (their Figure 1, 
p.461).
9
  
Hypothesis 2: First-period contributions will be higher in VCM-H than in VCM-L, and in 
Pun-H than in Pun-L.  
Absent opportunities for punishment, BD12 do not find evidence of sustained differences in 
contributions across decision rounds associated with instruction format. Based on their 
                                                          
9  BD12 do not test for differences, or analyse contributions in detail.  
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results, we hypothesize that instruction format will not lead to differences in contributions in 
our treatments that do not include punishment opportunities.  
Hypothesis 3: Aggregating across decision rounds, there will be no difference in average 
contributions between VCM-L and VCM-H.  
It has been shown in previous work that punishment opportunities raise contributions (e.g. 
Fehr and Gächter, 2000). This is due to the fact that low contributors are predominantly 
targeted for punishment. However, targeting of low contributors crucially hinges on subjects 
recognising that contributions are beneficial. That such targeting is not always observed (see 
Hermann et al., 2008 and Rand et al., 2010 for evidence on „anti-social‟ punishment) suggests 
that the punishment game is more cognitively demanding. Further, related work finds that 
subjects are less successful at establishing a cooperative norm that can then be enforced by 
punishment in more complex games that involve heterogeneity (e.g., Reuben and Riedl, 2009 
& 2013; Robbett, 2016) or interior equilibria (e.g., Cason and Gangadharan, 2015). If, as we 
hypothesise, the HIGH instructions are associated with higher comprehension levels of the 
positive externality associated with public good contributions, we would expect that subjects 
are more easily able to establish a cooperative norm in Pun-H than in Pun-L. Thus, we 
hypothesise that punishment is used more effectively to raise contributions in Pun-H than in 
Pun-L.  
Hypothesis 4: Average contributions will be higher in Pun-H than in Pun-L. 
 
4. Results 
The presentation of results is organized around an exploration of the effect of differences in 
instruction length and content on comprehension levels in the different treatments, overall 
group performance, and punishment behaviour as an explanation for observed differences in 
behaviour. In all analyses, unless otherwise specified, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are used to 
make pairwise comparisons between treatments and reported p-values are for two-sided tests.  
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4.1 Game comprehension – decision times 
Figures 1(a) and (b) present the empirical CDFs of individual contribution and punishment 
decision times across all decision rounds.
10
 To facilitate straightforward visual comparison, 
we display those observations with contribution (punishment) decision time up to 10 (27) 
seconds. At least 90% of all decisions were made within these time limits.
11
  
Figure 1. Empirical CDF of individual decision times 
(a) Contribution decisions 
 
(b) Punishment decisions 
 
                                                          
10
 We also analyse the time taken by subjects to answer the pre-experiment quiz (Appendix C1). We find that 
subjects in the HIGH treatments take significantly less time answer the quiz than do those in the LOW 
treatments. One possible reason for why subjects perform better on the quiz in the treatments with the HIGH 
instructions could be that two of the examples in the instructions also appeared on the quiz. 
11
 Figures C2 and C3 in online Appendix C1 present the corresponding figures using the entire range of 
observed decision times.  
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The figures show that the distributions of both contribution and punishment decision times 
for subjects who received the HIGH instructions displays first-order stochastic dominance 
over the distribution for subjects who received the LOW instructions, both with and without 
punishment opportunities.  
Figure C4 in Appendix C3 presents empirical CDFs of contribution decision times 
comparable to Figure 2(a) for different contribution ranges. The figures show that the first-
order stochastic dominance noted above is observed at zero contributions, low contributions 
(0 to 5 tokens), high contributions (16 to 20 tokens), and full contributions of 20 tokens. 
Thus, in treatments with the HIGH instructions, subjects took less time to make either low or 
high contributions. This suggests that the HIGH instructions were successful in increasing 
subjects‟ understanding of both the free-riding incentives and the benefits of high 
contribution levels, i.e., of the conflicting incentives in the game.
12
  
In further analysis, Table 2 provides the average time taken to make contribution decisions 
(VCM-L and VCM-H) and contribution-punishment decisions (Pun-L and Pun-H) in a round. 
The first two columns present average decision times in the first round, and the last two 
columns present average decision times averaged over all 20 rounds. In relation to 
contribution or punishment decisions, because subjects made decisions within their groups, 
we treat a group as an independent observation. For each group, we first calculate the average 
of the variable for all 4 players in a round and then over all 20 rounds, thus resulting in one 
observation per group. The summary statistics in the table use this average for each group. 
The number of observations in each test is the number of groups in each treatment.  
 
  
                                                          
12
 We do not perform a similar analysis of punishment decision times. This is because punishment decisions are 
reactions to actual observed contributions in the group. A figure that breaks punishment levels into different 
ranges would have to control for the different contribution levels in the group in each round prior to each 
punishment decision. An empirical CDF cannot control for this.  
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Table 2. Mean decision time in seconds 
  First round All 20 rounds 
Treatment Obs. Contribution Punishment Contribution Punishment 
VCM-L 11 16.64 - 5.03 - 
 
 (8.04)  (1.37) 
 
Pun-L 15 17.12 36.22 5.58 18.58 
 
 (7.44) (11.41) (1.31) (1.81) 
VCM-H 10 12.70 - 3.72 - 
 
 (5.59)  (1.11)  
Pun-H 12 20.60 30.52 4.48 16.67 
   (13.04) (4.82) (1.39) (1.45) 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations across groups within a treatment for the group experiment tasks. 
We dropped 6 instances (out of 3840) with a recorded contribution decision time of 99999, i.e., where subjects 
made decisions instantly. 
Focusing on contribution behaviour in the first round and controlling for treatment 
conditions, Table 2 shows that subjects took less time to make contribution decisions in 
VCM-H than VCM-L, but more time in Pun-H than Pun-L. They also took less time to make 
punishment decisions in Pun-H than in Pun-L. None of the differences across treatments in 
the first round is statistically significant (p > 0.10 for all tests).
13
  
Averaged over all rounds, subjects took less time to make contribution decisions in the 
treatments with the HIGH instructions. The differences are statistically significant for 
contribution decisions in both the VCM (n = number of groups in each treatment, p = 0.0221) 
and the punishment treatments (n = number of groups in each treatment, p = 0.0570). 
Subjects also took significantly less time to make punishment decisions in Pun-H than in 
Pun-L (n = number of groups in each treatment, p = 0.0097). Thus, while first round decision 
times are not very different across treatments, decision times drop over time in the treatments 
with the HIGH instructions.
14
 We thus find support for Hypothesis 1.  
Result 1: The average time taken to make contribution and punishment decisions is 
significantly lower in the treatments with the HIGH instructions. 
 
                                                          
13
 The standard deviation of punishment decision times in the first round is significantly lower in Pun-H than in 
Pun-L (p = 0.0068). 
14
 Appendix C4 presents additional analysis of variation in decision times, within and across treatments. 
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4.2 Group public good contributions 
Figure 2 presents mean group contributions across rounds in all treatments. Table 3 presents 
summary statistics of mean group contributions. As with decision times, an independent 
observation is a group of four subjects. For each group, we calculate the contribution to the 
public good in the first round, or the average contribution over all 20 rounds of the game.  
 
 
Figure 2. Mean group contributions (group endowment = 80) 
 
Table 3. Mean (st dev) group contributions (group endowment=80) 
 
 Round 
 Treatment Obs. First  All 20  
VCM-L 11 34.27 25.98 
 
 (10.53) (11.44) 
Pun-L 15 33.87 43.12 
  (10.93) (18.95) 
VCM-H 10 44.7 31.01 
 
 (14.28) (14.21) 
Pun-H 12 42.00 60.02 
   (14.69) (20.47) 
Each group forms an independent observation. Each observation is the average of the relevant variable for that 
group, averaged over all 20 periods. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Consistent with BD12, the different instruction formats lead to different contribution 
behaviour in the very first round; contributions start higher in the treatments with HIGH 
instructions, both with and without punishment. The difference is statistically significant in 
the absence of punishment opportunities, i.e., VCM-H vs. VCM-L (two-sided p = 0.0757, 
one-sided p = 0.0393) and marginally so in the presence of punishment opportunities, i.e., 
Pun-H vs. Pun-L (two-sided p = 0.1429, one-sided p = 0.0746). We thus find mild support for 
Hypothesis 2.  
Result 2: First-period contributions are higher in treatments with longer instructions, both 
with and without punishment. The difference is statistically significant in the VCM treatments 
and mildly so in the Pun treatments. 
Figure 3 shows that mean contributions start at just over 30 tokens in the LOW treatments 
and at about 45 tokens in the HIGH treatments. In the two VCM treatments, contributions 
follow the usual pattern and steadily decline to about 20 tokens, or 25% of group endowment, 
by round 20. Moreover, except for the initial few rounds, the dynamics over time are similar 
in both treatments. Table 3 confirms the general patterns observed in Figure 3. Parallel to 
BD12, average group contributions (over all rounds) in VCM-L are not significantly different 
from those in VCM-H (p = 0.4595). We find support for Hypothesis 3.  
Result 3: Average contributions in VCM-L and VCM-H are not significantly different. 
The decline in contributions is not observed in the two punishment treatments. Figure 3 and 
Table 3 show that overall average contributions in both punishment treatments are higher 
than in the two VCM treatments. Tests confirm that contributions in VCM-L are significantly 
lower than in Pun-L (p = 0.0274) and that contributions in VCM-H are significantly lower 
than in Pun-H (p = 0.0056).
15
 
The figure shows a large difference in contribution levels between the two punishment 
treatments. In Pun-L, contributions stagnate at near initial levels throughout the 20 rounds. 
This is consistent with the result reported in Fatas and Mateu (2015) who also find that 
punishment leads to only a modest increase in contributions over initial levels. Contributions 
in Pun-H, however, rise to about 75% of endowment by round 5 and stay steady at that level 
for the remainder of the game. This pattern is similar to that widely documented in the 
                                                          
15
 Average contributions in VCM-L are also significantly lower than in Pun-H (p = 0.0011). However, average 
contributions in VCM-H are not significantly different than in Pun-L (p = 0.1077). 
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literature. Importantly, average (over all rounds) contributions in Pun-L are significantly 
lower than in Pun-H (p = 0.0218). We find support for Hypothesis 3.  
Result 4: Averaging over all 20 rounds, the HIGH instructions are associated with greater 
contributions in the decision environment that allows for punishment.  
Result 3 and Result 4 together imply that the boost to contributions from the introduction of 
punishment opportunities is greater in treatments with the HIGH instructions. To test for this, 
we calculate, within instruction formats, the average increase in group contributions over the 
corresponding average VCM group contribution (averaged over all groups). The average 
increase is 17.14 tokens in Pun-L and 29.01 in Pun-H. The difference is (mildly) significant 
(p = 0.0877). 
4.3 Punishment use 
The above discussion shows that the impact of instruction-format is mainly observed in the 
punishment treatments. A potential reason for this result may be related to differences in how 
punishment is used. We first investigate to what extent groups make use of punishment. 
Figure 3 presents average punishment used at the group level over time in the two treatments.  
Figure 3. Mean group punishment 
 
Figure 3 shows that mean group punishment is positive in all 20 rounds. Further, groups in 
Pun-L use more punishment, on average, than do groups in Pun-H in the earlier rounds of the 
game. However, by about round 10, there is no discernible difference in the level of 
punishment between the two treatments. Averaging over all 20 rounds, there is no significant 
difference in the average amount of punishment used in a round between the two treatments 
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(7.55 tokens in Pun-L vs. 6.96 tokens in Pun-H; n = number of groups in each treatment, p = 
0.7883).
16,
 
17
  
Although similar amounts of punishment were used in both punishment treatments, we do 
observe significant differences in outcomes between the two punishment treatments.
18
 
Evidence from prior studies suggests that effective punishment is associated with targeting 
low contributors and not targeting high contributors (blind revenge or anti-social behaviour). 
See, for example, the discussion in Hermann et al., 2008, Rand et al., 2010, and Ramalingam 
et al., 2016. 
Because the HIGH instructions were designed to make the positive externality of 
contributions to the public good more explicit, and therefore the detrimental effect of free 
riding, we expect differences in the targeting of punishment across treatments.  
Panel random-effects regressions were used to examine the amount of punishment received 
by an individual in a round. Since we are interested in seeing if low (high) contributors are 
targeted for punishment, we once again estimate separate regressions for negative and non-
negative deviations. The model results are presented in Table 4 (first two columns). The 
amount of punishment received increases with the size of the negative deviation, but not with 
the size of the positive deviation of an individual‟s contribution from the average of the 
others in the group. Consistent with the aggregate finding reported above, instruction format 
does not significantly impact the amount of punishment received.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 The standard deviations were 5.96 in Pun-L and 6.37 in Pun-H. 
17
 On average, 1.6 group members used punishment to reduce the earnings of other group members in a round in 
Pun-L, while the figure was 1.5 in Pun-H. The difference is not significant (p = 0.8835). 
18
 Appendix C5 presents analysis of reactions to punishment – we do not find differences across instruction 
formats. Appendix C7 presents analysis that identifies „successful‟ groups in Pun-L and Pun-H in terms of high 
contributions and explores their use of punishment. 
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Table 4. Determinants of received punishment 
 Individual Random effects Probit 
 
Negative 
deviations 
Non-negative 
deviations 
Negative 
deviations 
Non-negative 
deviations 
Absolute deviation from average 0.247
***
 0.045 0.190
***
 0.060
***
 
contribution of others (0.067) (0.033) (0.024) (0.023) 
     
HIGH instructions dummy 0.216 -0.208 0.984
***
 -0.185 
 (0.739) (0.526) (0.365) (0.341) 
     
Absolute deviations × 0.082 -0.023 -0.096
***
 0.049 
HIGH instructions dummy (0.078) (0.044) (0.034) (0.039) 
     
Constant 1.411
**
 2.629
***
 -0.219 0.129 
 (0.603) (0.577) (0.345) (0.288) 
Observations 765 1395 765 1395 
Standard errors clustered at group level in parentheses. Includes round dummies (not reported). 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 - 
Significant at, resp., 10%, 5% and 1%. 
To examine the likelihood of being punished, Probit regressions were estimated. The 
dependent variable is 1 if an individual received any punishment in the round and 0 otherwise 
(Table 4, last two columns).  No difference between treatments is found in the case of non-
negative deviations. With negative deviations, the likelihood of punishment is increasing in 
the deviation of one‟s contribution from that of others.19 Importantly, the HIGH instructions 
dummy is positive and significant, indicating that subjects are more willing to punish 
negative deviations in Pun-H than in Pun-L. However, the interaction term indicates that 
punishment is somewhat more responsive to the magnitude of the deviation in Pun-L. As 
probit coefficients are not readily interpretable as magnitudes, to identify the net effect on 
punishment likelihood, Figure 4 presents predicted probabilities of receiving punishment, as a 
function of negative and positive deviations. 
 
  
                                                          
19
 This is so also for positive deviations. This is most likely related to anti-social punishment associated with 
“blind” revenge (Hermann et al., 2008).  
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Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of receiving punishment 
 
Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
As shown in Figure 4(a), negative deviations are less likely to be punished in Pun-L than in 
Pun-H. The positive and significant dummy in the probit regression in Table 5 captures this. 
As seen, this is particularly so for small deviations – the likelihood of punishment is 
significantly greater in Pun-H for deviations up to 10 tokens. The negative interaction term 
captures this difference between treatments. Subjects in Pun-H are less sensitive to the size of 
negative deviations than are subjects in Pun-L. They are simply more likely to punish 
negative deviations, regardless of their magnitude. The predicted probability of receiving 
punishment at the average negative deviation of 6.44 tokens
20
 is 0.643 in Pun-L and 0.897 in 
Pun-H. These are remarkably close to the actual punishment frequencies (over all sizes of 
negative deviations) of 0.70 and 0.92 in Pun-L and Pun-H respectively.
21
 The differences are 
not found to be significant for non-negative deviations, i.e., for „anti-social‟ punishment.  
Result 5: Subjects contributing below the mean of other group members are punished with a 
significantly higher frequency in Pun-H than in Pun-L. 
                                                          
20
 The average negative deviation across both punishment treatments was 6.44 tokens. The average absolute 
negative deviation was 5.89 tokens in Pun-L and 7.59 tokens in Pun-H. The larger deviation in Pun-H does not 
necessarily indicate that there are more free riders in Pun-H. On the contrary, it indicates that average 
contribution levels were lower in Pun-L, thus necessarily making deviations also smaller in magnitude.   
21
 A proportions test shows that these punishment frequencies of negative deviations are significantly different 
between the two treatments (p = 0.0104). 
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5. Conclusion 
Carefully crafted instructions are crucial for ensuring that experimental subjects fully 
understand the incentive structures within the laboratory decision setting. While previous 
evidence suggests that the length and format of instructions can significantly affect 
comprehension levels of experimental subjects in public goods games, we know of no 
evidence that overall behaviour is significantly affected. We hypothesise that comprehension 
levels might significantly affect behaviour, and results, in more complicated settings.  
In summary, in a public goods game with punishment, longer instructions with a more 
explicit discussion of the positive externality associated with public goods contributions are 
associated with more consistent targeting of low contributors and higher contributions to the 
public good. As discussed, studies have shown that the effectiveness of punishment in social 
dilemmas can be reduced in more complex decision settings. This is because the increased 
complexity lowers the ability of groups to coordinate on appropriate contribution norm that 
can then be enforced with punishment. In this sense, our study suggests that instructions that 
make the social dilemma more transparent to the subjects may improve the effectiveness of 
punishment.
22
 
Our results highlight alternative instruction-formats may impact behaviour, in particular in 
more complex decision settings. While our results provide evidence that instruction format 
can affect behaviour, our LOW and HIGH instructions varied in more than one dimension. 
More work is thus needed to identify the particular details of experimental instructions that 
might affect subject behaviour. 
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 While contribution behaviour is different, we do not find significant differences in earnings across treatments. 
See Appendix C6 for an analysis of earnings.  
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